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The port of Ashdod, which is located 25 miles
south of Tel Aviv, was opened to commercial
traffic in November, 1965, and its opening resulted
in the closing of two of the country's small
Mediterranean ports, Jaffa, which had been in
operation for at least 3,000 years,2 and Tel Aviv,
which had begun operations in 1936. Haifa,
hitherto Israel's only large port, situated in the
north of the country also felt, though less drasti-
cally, the impact of Ashdod's competition, since it
suffered an immediate decline in the volume of
cargo that it handled.
The first men to be employed as permanent port
workers in Ashdod were recruited from two dif-
ferent backgrounds: from the defunct ports of
Tel Aviv and Jaffa, and from the ranks of the
labourers who had been employed by the building
contractors, Sold Boneh3 during the four years
that it had taken to construct the port. The
original intention of the Israel Ports Authority
(IPA) had been to recruit its labour from the
ports of Tel Aviv and Jaffa and to augment
this force gradually as the port of Ashdod
developed. However, the labourers engaged
in the construction of the new port, mainly
new immigrants, became concerned about their
future employment as the port neared completion,
and staged a strike in October, 1965. Their chief
demand was that they be granted employment
as dock workers when the port commenced
operation. This strike occurred shortly before the
general election of 2nd November, 1965 and
during a period of economic recession so that
there was considerable pressure on the govern-
ment not only to act promptly, but also to be
seen to act promptly. The government quickly
responded to the strike and promised that the
workers would be transferred from So/el Boneh
1 The research was carried out in 1970/71 under the direction
of the late Professor Max Gluckman of the University of
Manchester on Reseatch Grant 779/1 of the Srcial Science
Research Counci, of reat Britain. Itt the summer cf 1977
a further t ant HR5209 from the SSRC has enabled me to
pursue a limited follow-up study.
2 Jaffa (Jopua in Creek), 2 Chronicles Chap. 2 v16 and Ezra
Chap. 3 v7.
3 Sole! Bonehthe largest censtruction company in Israel,
owned by 'he Htstadruth (the General Federation of Labour).
to the IPA. This promise threatened the men
from Tel Aviv-J aif a who had already been offered
employment in the new port. They were veteran
Israelis and experienced port workers who did
not see why their livelihood should be jeopardised
by new immigrants with no experience of port
work. The dilemma facing the IPA, that of com-
mencing operations during a trade recession with
an excess of labour, was partly resolved by
offering severance pay which exceeded anything
hitherto paid to redundant workers. Even so, 319
dockworkers made the move south and 485 Sold
Boneh labourers joined the IPA.
One consequence of this strike was that port
workers realised their power to put pressure on
their employer, the IPA, by virtue of their crucial
position in the national economy. Government
action signified the overruling of port manage-
ment on what it had regarded hitherto as one of
its prerogatives, namely the recruitment of man-
power. This submission was reaffirmed in 1967
when workers exerted pressure on the IPA, via the
government, to accept yet more port workers.
The IPA, which is a state-owned corporation, was
established in 1961 after the Israeli Parliament
had passed the Ports Authority Law earlier that
year. Although responsible to the Ministry of
Transport, the IPA is independent in its finances
and operations, and is governed by a 15-member
board, eight of whom represent public economic
bodies (shipping lines, the Export Institute, the
Citrus Marketing Board, the Histadruth or General
Federation of Labour, the Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation and the Haifa Labour Council) and six
of whom represent government ministries, all
presided over by an independent chairman.
According to its statute, the IPA must manage
the country's three ports (Haifa, Ashdod and
Eilat) in general and each one separately as a
viable economic unit, by at least balancing
revenue and expenditure, the latter including
development costs, interest and depreciation. The
IPA must therefore be a profit-making concern
without recourse to government subsidies and
rising costs must be met either by raising tariffs
or increased productivity. Higher tariffs are bound
to affect the sectional interests of at least some
of the members of the board, though ultimate
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decision on proposals to raise tariffs would have
to be ratified by the Government. This is one
of the basic issues pertaining to the IPA on which
the Government retains the final say (another is
the development budget). The Government also
appoint members of the IPA's board, the Director
of the IPA and the managers of the individual
ports.
Hence the same statute that grants the IPA
independence also restricts that autonomy by
reserving certain basic issues for the Government.
Apart from these statutory limitations on its
independence the Authority is also susceptible to
the influence and policies of the Government and
to pressures that groups and organisations can
exert on the Government so that in fact the IPA
is a government agency. Thus the wider national
interests that the Government has to take into
consideration may further infringe what senior
officials J the Authority regard as their preroga-
tives. Labour leaders in the ports as well as man-
agement are aware of the real locus of decision-
making in disputes between them. From experience
labour leaders know that pressure can be exerted
on the IPA by the Histadruth and by government
ministries, particularly those of Labour and Trans-
port. The IPA and its employees also recognise
the power of the Histadruth and each has sought
its aid in settling disputes in the port of Ashdod
and in other ports.
Prior to general elections the power of workers in
relation to that of management is enhanced, as
was revealed by the strike of the construction
workers who built the port. Party politics also
affect the relations between management and
labour in Israel where government ministries are
divided among the political parties that form the
ruling coalition. Thus change in the composition
of the cabinet can result in a shuffling of minis-
terial posts among the parties. For example, after
the 1969 elections the Ministry of Transport,
which since 1948 had been a preserve of Achdut
Avodah4, was allocated to Ga/ia!, a right-wing
political party that had first entered the govern-
ment shortly before the Six Days War in June,
1967. The new minister received leading port
workers from Ashdod in the home of the
mayor of Ashdod, who was also a member of
Galia!, and subsequently agreed to set up an
inquiry into labour relations in the port of
Ashdod. However, by the time the report was
4 Ach'Jut Avodah--a left-wing party which in 1965 was a mem-
ber of the Alignment with Mapai which in 1969 was a con-
stituent founder of the Irael Labour Party with Rai j and
Mapai.
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published in September, 1970, Gahal had already
withdrawn from the coalition government and the
Ministry of Transport was once again in the
hands of the Achdut Avodah faction, now a
member of the Labour party.
The IPA, its employees and the Government are
all sensitive to public opinion, which each of
them attempts to inform and to mobilise in
support of its case in dockland disputes. Hence
in 1970 the largest Works Committee in the port
of Ashdod appointed a local newspaper owner as
its public relations adviser in view ol the un-
favourable publicity that it had incurred as a
result of a series of strikes in the port; the Works
Committee made this appointment because of
what it considered to be the biased statements of
the public relations officers employed by the
Authority at Head Office and at each of the three
ports.
Because of the need for regular consultations
between the 1PA on the one hand and government
ministries, banks, the Histadruth, and clients on
the other, IPA headquarters were located in Tel
Aviv. Proximity to these bodies is indicative of
the role of headquarters in relation to its con-
stituents, the three ports. Although each port is
independent in its operations and free to compete
wïth the other ports in attracting clients, head-
quarters determines development projects, man-
power policy, wage policy, and budgets, and there-
fore requires close and immediate contact with
the institutions that deal with these matters. Port
workers interpret this location as indicative of
the remoteness of the IPA from the daily life of
the ports, and regard the officials in Tel Aviv as
bureaucrats who know little, if anything, about
the waterfront. They consider that 1-lead Office
should have been situated in either Ashdod or
Haifa though this would have inevitably aroused
the indignation of one of the two ports.
The town of Ashdod
The town of Ashdod has experienced rapid growth
since its creation in 1956, especially after the
subsequent decision to construct a deep-water
port there. From 4,600 in 1961 the, population
rose to 23.300 in 1965 and to approximately
38,000 in 1971. Most of this increase was due to
immigration, particularly of new immigrants to
Israel. Thus in 1965 over half of the population
(12,000) had conic to Israel since 1961. Not only
were the town's inhabitants new immigrants but
they were young: one half below the age of 19
and two-thirds below the-age of 30. Thus Ashdod
is a rapidly growing new town, populated mainly
by young immigrants and their numerous children.
As the largest single employer in the town, the
port with its workers is of great concern to local
politicians, who see it as a strong base for their
parties, who show considerable interest in its
affairs. In the national and local elections held
simultaneously in 1969, Ashdod was one of
several local authorities which voted for one party
at national level and for another at local level
(Arian 1972: 103). Nationally the town voted
for the left-wing Alignment, a coalition based on
the Labour parties of Mapai, Achdut Avodah,
Rafi and Mapam, but locally it elected Gahal, a
right-wing alliance between Herut and the General
Zionists (later Liberal) Party. This was the first
time in Ashdod's short history that the Labour
parties had not controlled the town and this
rejection expressed dissatisfaction with the Align-
ment on local issues including a dispute between
the Histadruth, which is controlled by the Align-
ment, and the Works Committee of the dockers
of the Port of Ashdod. The Alignment's candi-
date for mayor was also the Head of the Admin-
istrative Department of the Port, which supported
the Histadruth in the dispute, and the Labour
coalition lost votes as a result of this.
Although the right wing Gahal gained control of
the town council, nevertheless the Labour parties,
through their domination of the Ashdod Labour
Council (the local branch of the Histadruth) have
effective political and economic control over many
local enterprises, including those owned or ad-
ministered by the Histadruth. Examples are Ku pat
Ho/ini, the Histudruth Sick Fund which provides
medical care to most of the town's residents, and
the sports and youth clubs which attract many
of Ashdod's youth. Ashdod port workers sit on
the Labour Council as the representatives of
political parties. The Labour Council has a depart-
ment concerned with trade union affairs which
has the authority to declare a strike legal, thereby
granting official Histadruth support to the striking
workers. Consequently their roles as port workers
and Council members may come into conflict.
The manpower resources of the local branch of
the Histadruth are limited and so one official
deals full-time with all the works committees in
all the enterprises in Ashdod, including the six
committees in the port. Because of the local and
national importance of the port, its manager and
even his superior, the secretary of the local
Labour Council, are often bypassed when disputes
occur, since local workers may appeal directly to
officials at Histadruth HQ in Tel Aviv, and to
government ministries in Jerusalem.
In short, because of the divided allegiance of its
members, its inadequate manpower resources, and
the strategic national importance of the port
leading to the direct involvement of national
bodies, the local Labour Council is weaker than its
nominal inferior, the local committee of dock
workers.
The growth of the port
Ashdod port expanded rapidly during the first
years of its operation and this expansion was
significant not only for its own workers but also
for employees in Israel's other Mediterranean
port. Haifa, which competes for cargoes with
Ashdod. The initial effect of Ashdod's opening in
Haifa was that the latter suffered a decline in
the handling of both exports and imports as some
of these moved to its young rival. Thus it was not
until 1969/70 that Haifa exceeded the amount of
cargo that it handled in 1965/66.
The opening of Ashdod port reduced not only the
volume of trade passing through Haifa port but
also the political power of 1-Taifa port workers.
When the ports of Tel Aviv and Jaffa were Haifa's
only rivals the latter's workers did not need to
seek an alliance with the men from the southern
ports since they were not competing for cargoes
because Tel Aviv and Jaffa were lighterage ports
and handled only a few ships per month. How-
ever, when the Haifa men went on strike, they
appealed to the Ashdod workers not to accept
diverted ships.
One outcome of rapid expansion and subsequent
opportunities for promotion in the early stages
was that expectations of advancement came to be
considered the norm, and this led to disappoint-
ment by 1971 when workers who had been em-
ployed perhaps six months or a year less than
their workmates felt their promotion prospects
blocked. In addition men who had gained pro-
motion from stevedore to fork-lift truck driver
found themselves earning less than before since
there was no work for them in their new occu-
pation and they had to remain on stand-by with
no chance of earning bonuses.
Promotion was not confined to rank and file
workers, since their elected leaders, members of
the Workers' Committee of the Operations
Department also benefited and became foremen.
Thus three predecessors of the current Secretary
of the Workers' Committee of the Operations
35
Department gained promotion between 1965 and
1967, as did other members of that Committee.
Changes in the membership of the Operations
Workers' Committee affected relationships be-
tween the Committee and port management,
especially when one committee refused to
acknowledge agreements reached by its prede-
cessor.
Thus rapid expansion created a situation of fluidity
both within the ranks of the workers and in their
relationships with management. As far as manage-
ment was concerned, the turnover in leadership
among port workers created problems about
continuity and predictability in relationships so
that management itself became interested in the
establishment and maintenance of a stable leader-
ship for port workers.
The port of Ashdod had 1.501 permanent employ-
ees on 31st March, 1970 distributed among five
dejartments:
Admin. Engin. Finance Marine Operations Total
By far the largest is the Operations Depart-
ment whose main task is the loading, unloading
and storage of cargo. Space precludes a long des-
cription of the occupational complexities of this
department (but see Mars, forthcoming), suffice
it to say that the basic work unit is the gang of
stevedores, assisted by winchmen or coastal crane
operators and by fork-lift truck operators whose
work is co-ordinated by the gang leader, known
as the signaller, all of whom are supervised by a
foreman. The gang is not a stable unit since its
composition may be modified by technological
factors such as the type of crane employed, the
nature of the cargo (which may require more or
less workers), and workers' norms. For example,
the principle of seniority is critically relevant
when work is scarce so that junior signallers may
have to stand down and their gangs be dispersed.
The basic cause of fluctuation in the composition
of the work gang is the seasonal flow of work.
The permanent work force is sufficient to man 45
work gangs per day and at the height of the citrus
season between 65 and 67 gangs are required.
This is achieved by the recruitment of temporary
labourers from the labour exchanges in and
around Ashdod. At this time winchmen become
signallers and stevedores with winchmen's certifi-
cates move up on deck and are replaced in turn
in the hold by temporary, unskilled workers.
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52 97 74 111 1,167 1,501
The Operations Department is characterised by its
dominance within the port, by the transience of
its basic unit, and by the high degree of segmen-
tation among the department's workers which
derives from the diversity of occupations. Thus
the department contains three separate works
committees, one for foremen, one for warehouse-
men, and one for the men who work in gangs
assisted by the crane and fork-lift operators. This
last committee, which is styled the Operations
Committee, itself represents a wide range of
occupations.
Against this background of transient working
relationships we have one stable fixture, the
Operations Committee, to which the dockers can
turn when they have problems, whether about
pay, conditions of employment, promotion, and,
in some cases, domestic problems. The position
and strength of the Operations Committee in the
port which arises out of the segmentation of its
workers, is enhanced by the status which manage-
ment accords it in dealing with those workers and
their problems.
Manaement has acquiesced to the incorporation
of the Operations Committee into the administra-
tive organisation of the port. This incorporation,
however, was not granted to the Committee as
an automatic right but was achieved as a result
of a series of confrontations between management
and workers, when management lost complete
control over the recruitment of labour, over the
promotion of workers and managerial officials
and over the timing and holding of occupational
coarses. Outwardly and officially, management
claims that it still has the decisive say in these
matters, and the Operations Committee is content
to help maintain this front since it enables it to
hold power without being publicly responsible
for the administration of the department or of the
port.
The first major confrontation between manage-
nient and the workers in the Operations Depart-
ment took place in December, 1966 and early
1967. a period of economic recession in Israel
when there was little work in the port. This con-
frontation was known as the Strike of the Forty,
and its origins are to be found in the agreement
to transfer labourers engaged in construction of
the port from So/el Bone/i to the employment of
the Authority which was signed by the latter and
the Histadrut/i. This agreement stipulated that
those who had been in employment with the con-
structor on and prior to 31st December. 1963
would have the right of transfer. There were
labourers who had commenced work after that
date hut before the port was officially opened in
November, 1965. Among them were the forty
labourers who staged a hunger strike in the offices
of the Ashdod Labour Council and outside the
gates of the port.
The forty had been employed as temporary port
workers since the opening of the port and had
been given the impression by the Works Com-
mittee that they too would be granted permanent
status, despite the fact that they were clearly
excluded by the terms of the agreement. The local
Labour Council, after initially opposing the forty,
decided to give them backing. The permanent
workers were divided on the issue; those who
subscribed to the view that the legal agreement
should be honoured were overruled by more
militant men, some of whom came from the rank
and file, among them the current Secretary of
the Works Committee, who decided to back the
demands of the forty.
After progressing through the various stages for
settling disputes, management, workers and their
representatives in the Labour Council and in the
Trade Union Department of the Histadruth,
agreed to submit the question to the arbitration
of the Minister of Labour. Management based
their case on two points:
I. that the forty were not covered by the transfer
department;
2. that the Minister of Labour himself had stated
in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) that an
enterprise would not be obliged to accept more
workers than were economically required for its
operation.
Management argued that the recruitment of man-
power was its prerogative and that management
alone would determine, along rational, economic
lines, the labour force it required; moreover,
during the current recession there was not
enough work for the permanent workers, let alone
for another forty, the equivalent of more than
two work gangs.
The Works Committee and the Histadruth con-
ceded that management was legally right to ex-
clude the forty from permanent employment, but
they stressed the role of the port in the economy
of the new town of Ashdod and argued that
management should absorb the men in order to
establish good will with the town during the
recession. They also argued that the port would
eventually require additional manpower.
The Minister of Labour in his arbitration found
that the Authority was right to deny the forty
permanent employment, but argued that the port
of Ashdod was an expanding concern and there-
fore it should grant the forty the status of 'mini-
mum workers', i.e., a transitional status between
temporary and permanent workers which guaran-
teed the worker a minimum number of days' work
per mouth gradually increasing over a period of
years until he became a full-time employee. (This
status was abolished in 1969.)
As a result of this verdict, the port manager of
Ashdod resigned on the grounds that his position
had become untenable. Port management con-
sidered that the verdict had given the workers
the green light to repudiate signed agreements and
to use naked force to back up their demands in
the knowledge that the Government and the
1-tistadruth would give them support. The Govern-
ment, however, took into consideration factors
that were outside the scope of port management
such as the social, economic and political prob-
lems of development towns populated by new
immigrants during a period of recession. The
strike leaders, who regarded the verdict as the
triumph of natural justice over the narrow, legal-
istic attitude of the management, appreciated that
they had to rely on their own efforts rather than
those of the Histadruth which had signed the
original agreement. The dispute heralded the
arrival of leaders whose strength derived not from
links with the Histadruth, nor with political
parties, but from within the port itself. However,
the emergence of such leaders meant that they
were courted by political parties and by the
Histudruth.
The strike was successful because the Committee
was able to mobilise forces, particularly govern-
mental, that lay outside the port, but which could
be invoked legitimately as part of the accepted
procedure for dispute settlement. Another con-
frontation a few months later, which concerned
the recruitment of foremen from outside the port
dd not have as successful a conclusion as the
Committee had wished, but paved the way for
the Committee to insist that it would, in the
future, never accept candidates for the post of
foreman from outside the Operations Department
and a fortiori from outside the port, even though
the Labour Agreement stipulates that posts within
the Authority are open to all of its employees.
The IPA is thus caught between the demands of
government ministries and the pressures exerted
by its employees. Thus, after pressure from
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workers, it relinquished control over areas that
could be defined as non-work e.g., the allocation
of the canteen licence and the management of a
minor insurance fund, since these concessions
could be considered not to be challenges to its
managerial position. On the recruitment of
labour, the IPA was legally bound to accept the
arbitration of the Minister of Labour, who saw
the issue as one that reached beyond the confines
of the port to embrace the social and economic
welfare of new towns inhabited by new immi-
grants. In this instance the pressure on the IPA,
which had originally come from below, from its
workers, was strengthened from above by the
government. However, the IPA under its first
Director, a tough, capable, and independent-
minded person, so frequently came into conflict
with the government, the Histadruth and with the
dockers, that in 1970 he was ousted from his post
after an inter-ministerial Committee of Inquiry on
Labour Relations in the port of Ashdod (which
seemed to have been established expressly to
remove him from office), and was replaced by a
man from the Foreign Office whom the govern-
ment hoped would be more flexible and susceptible
to its influence.
The dockers are able to exert pressure on the
government because of the vital economic and
political role of the port in the national economy.
Unlike some other workers in the port, the admin-
istrative, engineering, and warehouse employees,
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for exarnp!e. the dockers can bring the port to
an immediate standstill by their refusal to work.
A stoppage in the port is not simply a local event
but a national concern in a small country with
two main ports which constitute its lifelines.
Because of the port's national significance, govern-
ment ministers and senior officials of the Hitadruth
qLuck!y became involved in labour disputes. The
leaders of the dockers, who have direct contact
with such notables, themselves become national
lIgures who owe their position to the local power-
hase that they have built up in the port quite
independently of political parties or of the local
LaboLir Council. This power, moreover, was
derived from aseries of industrial conflicts which
challenged the claims of the IPA to jurisdiction
in matters of recruitment, promotion and tech-
nn!ogical change.
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